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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of formal and informal institutions on the Chinese music 
industry. Standard utilitarian theory states that property rights are essential for innovation and 
this research tests the effects that intellectual property rights has on the Chinese music 
industry by using panel data on the provincial level for the years 1997 to 2011. In order to 
further investigate the Chinese music industry, social norms are studied by the means of a 
survey conducted in China as well as in Sweden in order to test for cross-cultural differences. 
The results show that intellectual property rights protection has a positive effect on music 
production in China. However, this effect is only significant and positive for coastal regions, 
and not for non-coastal regions. On the microeconomic level, the results prove that consumer 
behavior is affected by perceptions of illegality. Furthermore, the results show that Chinese 
consumers are more accepting of music piracy and have a lower will to pay for music 
compared to Swedish. Hence, this study demonstrates the importance of social norms and 
intellectual property rights when it comes to music production and consumption.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
China is a big potential market in the music industry with the world’s largest population and 
over 618 million Internet users1. When it comes to the size of the music industry, however, 
China only measures up to be the 21st biggest music industry in the world (IFPI 2014: 36). 
One of the major challenges for the industry is that China is estimated to have a high level of 
music piracy. In 2012, music piracy was estimated by The International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry2 (IFPI) to be at an astonishingly high level of 99 percent (IFPI 2012: 
23). Secondly, China also has a history of weak legal protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPR). The National Copyright Administration (the primary administrative organ for 
developing and enforcing copyright law) has been criticized to be relatively weak and under-
resourced. Along with that, property rights law enforcement has provided little deterrence 
value because the damages awarded are often too low (China Music Business 1).  
 
Considering the high piracy environment in China, – is there hope for a profitable music 
industry? Since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, rules and 
regulations regarding copyright protection have been strengthened. After the WTO entry, 
China has lowered the threshold for criminal prosecution of copyright infringement. In 
addition to that, the popular music search engine, Baidu MP3 Search, was cancelled due to 
Baidu enabling users to download music effortlessly (Priest 2014). Since 2011, Baidu has 
started to pay royalties to the record labels and removed many links to pirate music websites3. 
As the controls of piracy become stricter, which seems to be the case in China, it may 
increasingly become a viable music market in the coming years. The IFPI has estimated that 
China is now on its way to a paid model, meaning that consumers are starting to pay for 
music. The government has started to take more action against file sharing both in 
                                                
1 Calculated from the year 2013. 
2 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry claims to be not-for-profit international organization 
that represents the recording industry worldwide (IFPI 1). 
3 This solution is a product of an agreement between Baidu and Warner, Sony BMG and Universal (INA Global 
1). 
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enforcement and raising consumer awareness of IPR, according to the vice minister Yan 
Xiaohong of the National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC) (IFPI 2014: 36-37).  
Taking the remarkably smaller country of Sweden as an example, online music services such 
as Spotify and Youtube are widely used. Subscription and streaming of music is estimated to 
have contributed greatly to decrease piracy in Sweden, along with a stricter legal framework 
(The Economist 1). In 2013, music revenues in Sweden were estimated to be around 194.2 
million US dollars (IFPI 2014: 34-35). Comparing this to China, which in the same year was 
estimated to have music revenues of 82.6 million US dollars, it is quite impressive 
considering Sweden’s population only is around 0,7 percent of Chinas population (IFPI 2014: 
36). Hence, when it comes IPR protection of music, Sweden and China could be seen as two 
great opposites. The effects that formal laws in the form of IPR have on music production will 
be researched in this study. However, in order for formal laws to change, informal institutions 
in the form of social norms need to change as well (Williamson 2000). Thereby, this research 
further aims to analyze the norms surrounding the music industry.  
1.2 Research Purpose 
Some scholars argue that piracy is beneficial for both consumers and producers because it 
lowers access barriers to a wide variety of goods and can thereby drive innovation. For 
example, Raustiala & Sprigman (2012: 7) claim that there is a “piracy paradox” where 
copying spurs innovation in some industries and in others social norms contribute to keeping 
the innovation going.  With piracy, consumers could be better off because they get a broader 
variety of goods to a lower price, and the producers benefit from this because a lot of creative 
artists gather inspiration from previous works (Priest 2014: 520). Standard property rights 
theory, however, states that protection of IPR is crucial for innovation and development 
(Bergh & Jakobsson 2010; Menell 1990; Fromer 2012). The aim of this research is to 
investigate how IPR protection affects music production in China. If a positive correlation 
between well developed legal institutions and production of CD products can be shown, it can 
give incentive to further develop IPR protection and thereby increase music production and 
innovation.  
 
The formal laws do not solely guide consumer behavior; behavior is also guided by the social 
norms surrounding the consumers (Nee 2010). Since illegal downloading is a big obstacle for 
music companies trying to make profits on music sales, knowledge of social norms is 
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believed to be of use for a future viable music industry. Thereby, the norms of behavior of 
Chinese music consumers will be studied and compared to Swedish music consumers in order 
to investigate how IPR protection is viewed on the micro-level and whether or not there are 
cultural differences in social norms that affect the music industry. Hence, the thesis provides a 
two-stage analysis; the legal environment on provincial level and micro-behavioral data by 
means of a survey. The main aim of this thesis is to answer the following question: 
 
– How do formal and informal institutions affect the Chinese music industry? 
1.3 Methodology 
To investigate how IPR protection affects music production in China, a fixed effects 
regression is performed on macroeconomic data collected from China’s Statistical Yearbooks 
(1997-2013). Furthermore, in order to research the drivers of the will to pay for music, a 
micro-level study is performed by the means of a survey conducted in China as well as in 
Sweden, with 210 and 215 respondents respectively. The target group for the survey is young 
adults since they are the first generation to have grown up using the Internet and are thereby 
assumed to have the technological skills to download music illegally. The answers are then 
analyzed by performing regressions on the will to pay for music among Chinese consumers, 
as well as regressions to see whether or not I can establish differences in behavior across 
Chinese and Swedish consumers. Hence, the micro-level analysis consists of two steps; one 
where the drivers behind the Chinese’ social norms are analyzed and one where the potential 
differences in social norms between Chinese and Swedish respondents are studied.   
1.4 Limitations  
The data on CD production on provincial level might not provide the whole picture of music 
production. Music consumption has changed dramatically over the past decades and only 
looking at CD production could be misleading. In the beginning of the data for CD production 
(year 1998) music was also consumed through cassette tapes and now, by the end of the data, 
music is also consumed through computer files that might never be released as CDs. 
However, data on all music production is not available and CD production should give a 
broad picture, since it is a music device that has been in use during the whole period.  
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Regarding the two surveys conducted for this research, one limitation is that the respondents 
can be assumed to have a reference-point4 when it comes to how much they are willing to pay 
for music. This reference-point might be the price on the market today and it is assumed to be 
lower for Chinese consumers, due to some of the most popular music streaming services in 
China being for free. This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the results. 
Furthermore, certain confusion about what is legal or not occurred when conducting the 
survey in China. Several respondents were not sure how to answer the question of whether or 
not they know someone who has ever downloaded a music file illegally, because they did not 
know what was legal or not. However, the mere fact that this confusion occurred indicates 
that regulation regarding music is not very strong in China. None of the 215 Swedish 
respondents showed any sign of confusion regarding this question. Furthermore, the question 
on whether or not a person who downloaded illegally would be treated any differently 
afterwards was not specified as treated negatively or positively after illegal downloading. 
Thereby, the interpretation of the responds on this question is done with caution. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The thesis first covers an introduction of today’s music industry in China and Sweden along 
with the research purpose. A short description of the method and limitations follow in chapter 
1. Secondly, the theoretical framework provides a discussion on the music market structure. 
Theories on intellectual property rights, social norms and cross-cultural differences are then 
described. Section 3 explains the method, data and results for the macroeconomic study, while 
chapter 4 shifts the analytical focus to micro-behavioral responses. A discussion of the results 
is provided in chapter 5 along with conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
  
                                                
4 See for example Wenner (2015) on how expected prices can serve as reference-points. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
A perfectly competitive market implies that the producers will not make any profit in the long 
run because they will be forced to lower their price to the marginal cost in order to stay in the 
market (Varian 1992, p. 216). In the music industry, this cannot be assumed to be the case 
since the actors in the music industry in most cases seem to make profits that are above the 
marginal cost. Furthermore, the market is not perfectly competitive since the goods that are 
sold are differentiated. For example, most would agree that a firm (in this case a record label) 
selling music files with Britney Spears as the singer does not sell the same good as a record 
label selling Guns N’ Roses’ music. Looking at the music industry, we can say that the record 
labels have a monopoly on their artists. The consumers can only purchase an album or song of 
their favorite artist from one single label (Norbert 2004). This monopoly structure is, 
however, challenged by piracy. Thereby, intellectual property laws can be thought of as a way 
to “take back” the monopoly of music creation.  
 
Considering the music industry as a kind of monopoly market, the producers are selling the 
music at a price higher than the marginal cost. It is hard to know how high the marginal cost 
is for a music file and it can be assumed to vary for different producers. However, one can 
assume that distribution costs have decreased with the arrival of the Internet and that costs of 
production might have gone down with the technological development. This would imply that 
if the market structure were perfect competition, the price for the music would have gone 
down with the arrival of the Internet. It further implies that technological development should 
be positively correlated with music production, given that it lowers the costs of producing and 
distributing. 
 
If a good is a substitute to another good, the demand for the good goes up if the price for the 
other good goes up. Perfect substitutes refers to the case where if the price of one good rises, 
the consumer will be expected to substitute the good for the other good at a constant rate. 
Imperfect substitutes are goods that are substitutes to some degree, but the substitution rate 
depends on more than just the price (Varian 2010: 28-111). Pirated and original copies of 
music files can be considered imperfect substitutes to each other. If a consumer is choosing 
between a pirated music file and a legitimate one, the consumer’s choice between the two 
goods might depend on the prices and the quality of the goods. In this case, the quality of a 
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pirated music file can be assumed to be equally as good as the quality of the legitimate one. 
This would imply that, since the price of the pirated copy is zero, a consumer would always 
choose the pirated copy. However, this is clearly not always the case because a lot of people 
still choose to pay money for the original music files. Hence, there must be something else 
affecting the demand for the good, other than price and quality. Some consumers might find 
value in purchasing a legitimate music file simply because of the fact that it is legal and there 
might be consequences if you get caught. In other words, the formal institutions surrounding 
the music market might affect the consumption. A legitimate music file might be considered 
as a more luxurious good. Furthermore, if you pay for the good the producers and artists earn 
a profit that might be desirable for some music fans and in some cases an original file could 
be easier to get a hold of. Additionally, there is reason to believe that social norms come into 
play and reduce or increase illegal consumption. If downloading illegally is not socially 
acceptable, it might lower the likelihood of engaging in piracy. 
 
Another issue regarding the music market is the problem with excludability. A good is 
excludable if one can prevent non-paying customers to benefit from it and illegal file sharing 
challenges the excludability of music. Along with competing with hundreds of unlicensed 
music services, China further struggles with a low share of the profit going to the copyright 
holders, - only three percent of the total digital music sector revenues (IFPI 2014: 36). The 
problem with this is that such a low share of the profit might not provide enough incentive for 
further investment in the industry. The low profits for sales of recordings has lead to leading 
record companies in China relying heavily on live performance income, where non-paying 
consumers can easily be excluded. This is however not considered very profitable in the long-
run, which is why the music labels along with the government are now cooperating more in 
order to change the music environment (IFPI 2014: 37).  
 
The Chinese government controls a large portion of the music sold and consumed, both 
domestic as well as foreign. There is a list made by the Ministry of Culture that defines 
criteria for any officially distributed music, which includes restriction of promotion of 
religion, violence and crime in recordings. A list of unapproved foreign songs that were to be 
deleted from music websites (for example Last Friday Night by Katy Perry) was published in 
2011 (INA Global 1). Many of these restrictions can be seen as an obstacle for the growth of 
the music industry in China, because they limit the supply of legal music. In turn, this could 
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be assumed to give incentive for illegal consumption, because these songs have no legal 
distribution channel in China (Priest 2014). Aside from limiting censoring of music (which is 
not discussed in this research but is however encouraged for future studies), both formal 
regulation and informal institutions such as social norms has the potential to shape the 
incentives for illegal consumption.  
 
Williamson (2000) defines four levels of social analysis that provides a picture of how long it 
takes for different levels of institutions to change and how they are connected. His analysis 
suggests that the institutional environment (level 2), such as laws and property rights, cannot 
work without the other institutional levels. In other words, property rights will not be fully 
implemented if the informal institutions, such as social norms, do not change. These informal 
institutions, Williamson argues, can take 100 to 1000 years to change and have a huge impact 
on the way that formal institutions are realized.  
Figure 2.1 Williamson’s Four Levels of Institutions 
	  	  
Level Frequency (years) Purpose 	  	  
Level 1 
Embeddedness: informal 
institutions, customs, 
traditions, norms, 
religion 
100 to 1000 
Often 
noncaculative; 
spontaneous 
	  	  
  ê     é 
 
	  	  
Level 2 
Institutional 
environment: formal 
rules of the game - esp. 
Property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
10 to 100 
Get the institutional 
environment right. 
1st order 
economizing 
	  	  
  ê     é 
 
	  	  
Level 3 
Governance: play of the 
game - esp. Contract 
(aligning governance 
structures with 
transactions) 
1 to 10 
Get the governance 
right, 2nd order 
economizing 
  
  ê     é 
 
	  	  
Level 4 
Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and 
quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
Continuous 
Get the marginal 
conditions right. 
3rd order 
economizing 	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Source: The New Institutional Economics (Williamson 2000) 
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Applying Williamson’s four levels of institutions on the Chinese music industry, it is apparent 
that social norms play an important part in explaining the structure of the music industry and 
that both formal and informal institutions need to change in order for a transformation to 
happen.   
2.1 Intellectual Property Rights  
Without property rights protection, can there be a profitable music industry? Some might 
argue yes. The monopoly that artists have on their own music, as previously mentioned, 
implies that they can still profit in other ways. Live music is an important source of income 
for music labels due the excludability. Furthermore, artists and music labels can profit from 
activities that are related only to the publicity and recognition that music creation can bring. 
In other words, the artists become a brand and can thereby make money as such on the side of 
their music (Priest 2014). It is also important to note that creating music can be affiliated with 
benefits that are non-monetary, such as social status. Considering these alternative ways to 
profit on music (both monetary and non-monetary), there might not have to exist strong IPR 
protection in order for musicians to be willing to create music. In China, copyrights law 
conforms to international standards in many ways. In fact, the overall legal infrastructure 
cannot be said to be the problem when it comes to weak protection of intellectual property. 
However, this legal infrastructure is relatively novel and Chinese copyrights law has had less 
than two and a half decades to develop. IPR protection in China has faced pressure from 
outside countries, such as the US, and much improvement has been made and can be made in 
the future (China Music Business 2).  
 
Utilitarian theory of intellectual property rights generally states that patent laws lead to more 
innovation due to a creators right to his or her own work. This utilitarian framework is 
commonly used to explain and validate patent laws. The United States Constitution grants the 
power to Congress when it comes to patent and copyright laws as: “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts”, which is based on the utilitarian framework (Menell 1999). Property 
rights theory, as emphasized by Bergh & Jakobsson (2010: 64), states that in order to have a 
functioning private market there needs to be transparent information about who has the right 
to sell and who has the right to buy the good. An important factor for this to hold is 
functioning institutions for property rights. In other words, without property rights there is no 
working market. IPR protection also has a downside – it can form monopolies on the market 
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due one person holding the rights to a certain creation, which in turn is linked to a dead 
weight loss. However, John Stuart Mill (1862) argued that the monopoly situation which 
patent creates is justified due to the reward that it provides to the inventor and the benefits 
that consumers gain from the invention (Menell 1999). Hence, intellectual property rights 
protection can both have a positive welfare effect and a negative one. On one hand, it can be 
considered necessary for innovation to prosper and on the other hand it creates welfare loss 
due to monopoly power.  
 
Libertarian arguments regarding IPR protection are often used to critique the dominant 
theories that justify the protection. An argument provided by Barlow (1994) is that IPR limits 
the free exchange of ideas over the Internet, which is harmful because it enables corporate 
interests to gain control over the arts and politics. In fact, one could argue that in the specific 
case of China, piracy might be beneficial to consumers due to less censorship. Putting aside 
the possible benefits from music piracy, the question still stands whether or not intellectual 
property rights protection is needed in order for innovation to occur. In an article by Fromer 
(2012), the importance of IPR protection is further emphasized. She distinguishes between 
utilitarian theory and moral rights theory of property rights. While utilitarian theory is defined 
as copyright laws providing incentive for creation by giving creators exclusive rights to their 
work, moral rights theory also justifies IPR protection but is grounded in the belief that 
creators deserve rights due to having created the works. Fromer further discusses how 
utilitarian and moral rights theory can be combined and maximize the societal benefits by 
increasing and improving creative works. This opens up for discussion on why IPR protection 
is beneficial and emphasizes that not only can IPR protection lead to more innovation (which 
is good for the society as a whole) but one can also see it as if the creators deserve this 
protection simply for the creation.  
 
Considering standard utilitarian theory and the notion that stricter intellectual property rights 
protection leads to more innovation, the following hypothesis is derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Intellectual property rights protection is positively correlated with music 
production 
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2.2 Social Norms 
A social norm can be defined as a mean to coordinate behavior and expectations in 
interactions between people. In other words, norms unify social behavior, and deviating from 
the norms can lead to social disapproval or punishment. Social norms have power over a 
broad variety of phenomena, for example forms of communication, concepts of justice and 
property rights (Young 2007). Social norms are, unlike formal laws, monitored intrinsically 
and enforced by social interaction (Nee 2010). In the article Copyright Extremophiles: Do 
Creative Industries Thrive or Just Survive in China's High Piracy Environment? Priest (2014) 
states a set of reasons for China’s high level of piracy. First, he mentions that the threat of 
copyright enforcement is not sufficient because damages awarded to deter these illegal 
activities are too low. He also states that there are cultural, social and economic factors that 
play a part in explaining the high level of piracy. Even if there is no one around to see the 
illegal behavior, for example while sitting at home in front of a personal computer 
downloading an illegal music file, a social norm can still trigger a feeling of guilt or shame 
(Peyton 2007). As previously mentioned, downloading a pirated copy of a music file has zero 
cost. Therefore, whatever the cost of the legitimate music file, the pirated copy will always be 
economically ideal to the consumer. If IPR protection and the damages awarded if caught are 
low, it could provide strong incentives for engaging in piracy. However, if downloading 
illegally is not socially acceptable, i.e. not the norm, it might provide a barrier for illegal 
behavior beyond the legal environment.  
 
Nee and Opper (2012: 23-24) further emphasize the importance of analyzing the relationship 
between social norms and formal institutions. Opposition norms are norms that work against 
and undermine the formal institutions. If the norm is to download music illegally, it would 
imply that the norm is an opposition norm that undermines the legal system. According to 
Schelling (1978: 17), deviating from the formal laws is made acceptable or unacceptable 
depending on how the nearby society behaves. In other words, we could expect that if a 
majority of your friends download music illegally, you are less likely to consider it as 
unacceptable behavior. The reversed causality might also be true; that if people believe that 
illegal downloading is unacceptable, fewer people in their peer-group will engage in these 
illegal activities. In other words, it is hard to state the exact causality and there is reason to 
believe that there is a two-way effect.  
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A second hypothesis is based on the theory of social norms and the important role they play: 
 
Hypothesis 2. There is a relationship between social norms and consumer behavior of music 
in China 
2.3 Cross-Cultural Differences  
Consider these two scenarios; a mother binds her daughter’s feet in order to keep them small 
and burping loudly after eating a meal. These situations might be the norm in certain 
societies, but considered abnormal in others (Young 2014). Considering perceptions of illegal 
behavior when it comes to music consumption, the norms might differ between China and 
other countries.  
 
In this specific study, Sweden is used as the comparative example. As previously mentioned, 
China and Sweden can be seen as two opposites when it comes to the music industry. Sweden 
has relatively strong property rights protection and a large music industry in relation to its 
population, while China has a history of weak property rights protection and has a very small 
music industry in relation to its large population. However, the differences in music industry 
sizes might also be due to underlying social norms that vary between the two economies. 
Research by Schelling (1968) studies ethical systems and the consequences of constraints on 
behavior. These constraints can come from a broad spectrum of for example religion, ethics 
and law. Schelling claims that the extent to which different ethical systems affect social 
behavior can be vast and that ethics and law are in many cases similar to each other. This 
further motivates the importance of looking at social norms when defining music 
consumption and production in China, and motivates a cross-cultural comparison. 
 
Swinyard et al. (1990) researched the behavioral differences between Asia and United States 
when it comes to software piracy by reviewing cultural histories and property rights 
protection. Copyright protection is deeply rooted in Western culture, specifically in the US, 
where the creation of an individual is considered as owned by the individual and should be 
protected as such. In fact, protection of property rights originated in the Western world. Asia, 
on the other hand, provides a direct contrast. Asian countries, and China in particular, have a 
tradition of viewing individual creations as common goods that are best to be shared with the 
rest of society. In fact, to be copied is viewed as a compliment and honor in many Asian 
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nations. Third-world and Asian countries often emphasize that Western ideas of copyright 
protection are harmful for a nation’s long-run development due to monopoly power over 
production and distribution of knowledge-based products (Swinyard et al. 1990). Considering 
this view of copyrights in Asia, there is reason to believe that protection of copyrights would 
be hard to implement. 
 
In a paper written by Edward Sandels (2012), the results from a survey conducted in Sweden 
showed that a high level of respondents believed that the price for legal music files were 
unreasonably high. However, only 23 percent of the respondents believed that illegal file 
sharing was completely acceptable, which implies that there is a willingness to pay for music, 
although perhaps not as high as the price on the market. 10 percent of the respondents said 
that implementation of the IPRED law completely stopped them from downloading music 
(Sandels 2012). Sandels’ research gives an indication for the possible results in this research, 
and Swedish respondents can be assumed to have a lower acceptance level for illegal 
downloading than the Chinese. However, Jiang Di, a postgraduate at China University of 
Political Science and Law (CUPL) with a major in intellectual property rights law at, states 
that the social norms among young adults in China are changing. Chinese music consumers 
are used to not having to pay for music but there is a tendency towards more and more 
consumers paying for music. It is important to note, however, that in certain situations, 
downloading music for free is not illegal in China and some large companies pay royalties to 
the creators (Jiang Di 2015, pers. Comm., 28 April). Hence, the social norms surrounding 
music consumption in China might be highly influenced by the fact that receiving music for 
free is not always subject to illegality.  
 
Considering this history of cultural differences between Asia and the Western world, a third 
hypothesis is derived: 
 
Hypothesis 3. There are behavioral differences between Chinese and Swedish music 
consumers 
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3. Macroeconomic Study 
To test if IPR protection has a positive effect on music production, regression analysis is 
performed using a robust fixed effects regression with CD production as a proxy for music 
production. A fixed effects model is a linear regression where the intercept terms vary over 
individual units. In this case, time effects and province effects are included in order to control 
for province time-varying economic effects and heterogeneity across provinces. The data for 
the regression analysis is collected from China’s Statistical Yearbooks and the NERI index of 
marketization (Fan et al. 2011) and reflects data for the years 1997-2011. The NERI index of 
marketization is created by the National Economic Research Institute and is a commonly used 
index among researchers (see for example Du et al. 2008 and Lin et al. 2011).  
3.1 Choice of Estimates 
3.1.1 CD Production 
As a measurement for music production, the volume of CD production on provincial level, 
normalized by population size, is collected from China’s Statistical Yearbook for the years 
1998-2011. The decision of using the volume of CDs, and not the kinds, as a measurement for 
music production is due to it being considered more substantial since it reflects both 
innovation and a level of determination and expectancy to profit. On one hand, the total 
volume reflects innovation because the broader the variety, the bigger the total volume. 
Furthermore, only producing one copy of one CD indicates that it is only a one-time thing and 
that the producer does not show much determination to make profits. However, it might be 
interesting to note that in 2011 only 4716 different kinds of CDs were produced, which 
cannot be thought of as much considering the large population. Looking at the data of total 
volume of CD production, there is a high variance between different years and provinces. 
Figure 3.1 shows the total volume of CD production by year and figure 3.2 shows the 
provincial distribution of average CD production per capita for the years 1998 to 2011.  
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Figure 3.1 Nation Total Volume of CD Production by Year 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2012) 
 
Between 2004 and 2007, production of CDs was at the highest levels and since then we can 
see a slight decline. This could be due to the fact that a greater proportion of the music today 
is only released in electronic form and never produced as CDs. 
Figure 3.2 Average Provincial Volume of CD Production per Capita 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2012) 
 
From the graph above we can see that Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing and Tianjin have the 
highest levels of CD production per capita. All these provinces are coastal provinces5 located 
                                                
5 The capitol of Beijing is not directly located by the coast but is considered a coastal region in this study, due to 
its high development level and it being included as a coastal region in several previous studies (see for example 
Lampton 2001: 114; Jiang 2014: 85). 
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in eastern China. The high levels of CD production among these provinces might be 
explained by the fact that coastal provinces have prospered and experienced an almost 
unthreatened economic growth over the last 30 years in China. Thereby, coastal provinces are 
often subject to higher levels of development (Ramesh 2007). 
3.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
As a measure for intellectual property rights protection, the 2011 NERI Index of 
Marketization for China’s Provinces, published by the National Economic Research Institute 
(Fan et al. 2011) is used. This measure has been previously used as an indicator for IPR 
protection in a study performed by Du et al. (2008), which researches how property rights 
protection and contract enforcement affects foreign direct investment in China. The NERI 
Index of Marketization provides data of marketization over the years 1997 to 2009 on 
provincial level. The index measures marketization through five different fields with a total of 
23 basic indicators, where there is a sub-category for IPR protection. This sub-index is 
constructed by combining two ratios; a ratio of patent applications to GDP and a ratio of 
patent approvals to GDP. The distribution of the average levels of IPR protection, sorted by 
highest to lowest levels, is shown in the figure below.   
Figure 3.3 Regional Average Levels of IPR Protection (1997-2009) 
Source: NERI Index of Marketization (Fan et al. 2011) 
 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Beijing and Jiangsu show the highest levels of IPR 
protection. As with levels of CD production, all are considered coastal provinces. This shows 
that the provinces that experience the highest levels of CD production also display the highest 
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levels of IPR protection. Again, coastal provinces have been subject to higher development, 
which could explain the distribution. 
 
As an additional measure to protection of IPR, the share of lawyers and independent 
accountants in the population will be included in order to check for a potential relationship 
between law enforcement and music production. Using a sub-index of the NERI Index of 
Marketization on legal institutions and contract enforcement, one can see the proportion of 
lawyers and independent accountants out of the total population of the regions. This data 
reflects the development of the legal environment as during the pre-reform period in 
China there were no lawyers and accountants were not independent (Fan et al. 2011). 
Again, this data is available for the years 1997-2009.  
3.1.3 Control Variables 
In order to get non-biased results, a set of control variables are also included in the models. 
Reviewing previous economic literature, no direct previous research has been made regarding 
what variables affect CD production. However, previous research was found on the music 
industry in Japan where Hazucha & Rešovský (2012) discuss the factors that affect music 
sales. The factors affecting music sales might also be applied as factors affecting music 
production, with a few exceptions. Hazucha & Rešovský emphasize the importance of 
looking at income of the population as well as demography. When it comes to music 
production, one could assume that at least the first variable has an impact. Furthermore, it 
could be of interest to control for demography if one assumes that music production mostly 
targets young people. However, producers might be more likely to simply target a large 
market rather than a young market and music is consumed by people of all ages. Therefore, 
demography will not be taken into account in this research.  
 
(1) Gross Regional Product. The financial situation of the population, here measured through 
gross regional product per capita, is of importance to a producer since it might affect his or 
her future profit. GRP might also correlate with the level of IPR protection within a region 
and hence it is important to control for GRP confounding effects. Research by Mijiyawa 
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(2008) found that property rights institutions have a positive effect on economic growth6. The 
numbers are collected from China’s Statistical Yearbooks and are further normalized for 
inflation.  
(2) Technological Development. The technological development over the last decade has 
dramatically changed the way and the cost of music production and distribution. Technology 
has also made is easier to copy and share intellectual property, which can make enforcement 
of IPR more difficult. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that IPR protection affects the 
technology development positively by incentivizing innovation (Wakeman 2012; Monsef et 
al. 2011). A positive correlation motivates controlling for its confounding effects. Using a 
sub-category from the NERI index of marketization controls for the technological 
development within the region. The technological development is there measured by the 
market transaction value of technology as a share of GRP.  
(3) Higher Education. Controlling for the education level is of importance since there is 
reason to believe that IPR protection is more present and effective among a highly educated 
population. Furthermore, one could assume that highly educated people are more likely to 
innovate and file for patents  (Bušíková 1999). Thereby, it is necessary to control for its 
confounding effects. Education is here measured as the numbers of students enrolled in higher 
education normalized by regional population, which is gathered from China’s Statistical 
Yearbooks.  
(4) Foreign Direct Investment. FDI is included as a control variable in order to control for 
foreign integration in the region. There is reason to believe that foreign integration might lead 
to better production possibilities and that it spurs innovation, which in turn could have an 
effect on music production (Du et al. 2008). Furthermore, IPR could attract FDI and better 
protection of IPR is often used as negotiation device for international trade agreements (Fink 
& Maskus 2005).  The data for foreign investment is again taken from the NERI index and is 
defined as foreign direct investment as a share of GRP.    
(5) Share of Agriculture. Some control of the economic structure of the regions is necessary, 
and it can be assumed that the economic structure is correlated with IPR protection since 
some sectors in the economy are in greater need of IPR. The share of agriculture, normalized 
by GRP, will be used as an indicator for the economic structure. The share of agriculture is 
                                                
6 GDP per capita over five consequetive years is used as a measurement for economic growth in the study 
(Mijiyawa 2008). 
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collected from China’s statistical yearbooks for the years 1997-2011 and is defined by the 
gross output value of farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery.  
3.2 Model Specification 
The following empirical specification is used to estimate the effect of IPR protection on music 
production: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1Sit+ β2Xit + εit 
 
Where Yit is the outcome variable CD production, S is a vector of two different IPR protection 
measures and X is a vector of control variables discussed above. Using lags of three years on 
the variables for share of lawyers and accountants and protection of intellectual property, the 
causality will be more clear due to the assumption that it takes a certain amount of time (in 
this case three years are assumed) until law enforcement and protection of intellectual 
property has an effect on CD production. Year is further included as a dummy variable in 
order to control for time effects on the dependent variable. The group variable of the 
regression is provinces, which controls for province fixed effects. 
Two other regressions are further preformed, where coastal and non-coastal provinces are 
divided in order to see if IPR protection affects CD production differently between the two 
groups. The gap between coast and inland is extensive within the Chinese economy, where 
economic growth has been steadier in coastal provinces (Naughton 2007: 29-30). Considering 
the higher development within coastal regions, there is reason to believe that IPR protection 
might be more effective in those regions. Based on previous research, 12 regions7 are 
considered coastal in this analysis (see for example Lampton 2001: 114; Jiang 2014: 85). 
  
                                                
7 The coastal regions are: Beijing, Hebei, Zhejiang, Fujian, Liaoning, Tianjin, Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi, 
Shanghai, Shandong and Jiangsu. 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Below are descriptive statistics of the variables included in the macro analysis for testing 
hypothesis 1; share of CD production by population, level of intellectual property rights 
protection, share of lawyers and independent accountants in population, gross regional 
product, technological development, higher education, foreign direct investment and share of 
agricultural activity.  
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
CD production 307 .02 .05 .00 .40 
 
Independent variables 
IPR protection 307 4.23 7.9 -.62 53.51 
Lawyers & Accountants 307 3.04 2.63 -.70 11.28 
 
Control variables 
GRP (100 million yuan) 307 17,407.15 15,275.83 2,199.06 83,448.56 
Technological development     307 6.66 2.04 -3.67 10.23 
Higher Education 307 .01 .01 .01 .04 
FDI 307 2.9 2,94 -.12 17.92 
Share of agriculture 307 .25 .12 .02 .6 
 
To get an indication for a potential relationship between the dependent variable (CD 
production) and the two variables of interest; IPR protection and share of lawyers and 
independent accountants, two scatterplots with trend lines can be seen below. 
Figures 3.4 & 3.5 CD production and the two Independent Variables 
   
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2012) and the NERI index of Marketization (Fan et al. 
2011) 
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Observing the left scatterplot, there seems to be a weak positive trend between CD production 
and IPR protection. The right scatterplot further indicates a weak positive correlation between 
CD production and the share of lawyers and independent accountants. This should provide 
some implication for how the two measures for IPR protection might correlate with CD 
production.  
3.4 Results 
The results from a robust fixed effects regression on CD production is presented in the table 
below. Gross regional product was excluded from the original regression due to collinearity.  
Table 3.2 IPR on CD Production 
Variables CD production 
IPR protection (lagged) .0024** 
 (.00104) 
Share of lawyers & accountants (lagged) .0086 
 (.00956) 
Technological development .006** 
 (.00282) 
Higher education -1.354 
 (.0468) 
Foreign investment .00048 
 (.00186) 
Share of agriculture -.0582 
 (.05457) 
Constant -.0191 
 (.0336) 
  
Observations 307 
Number of provinces 31 
R-squared .212 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was performed and it showed that the data suffers 
from heteroskedastic standard errors8. This problem is fixed for by performing a robust 
regression. Checking for multicollinearity 9 , the correlations between the independent 
                                                
8 Heteroskedasticity is when the variance of the residuals varies across observations. Homoskedastic residuals is 
one assumption of a nonbiased OLS estimation (Dougherty 2011: 281-283). 
9 Multicollinearity indicates that one variable could be considered as a linear combination of other independent 
variables, which might cause unreliable estimates. The problem is present if the correlation is close to -1 or 1 
(Verbeek 2012: 43-46).	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variables are not considered too high, except for the correlation between Education and GRP 
of 0.824. A variance inflation factor test (VIF) was also performed in order to further test for 
a potential problem of multicollinearity, where a VIF value that exceeds 4 might be a sign of 
multicollinearity10. The VIF value for GRP is 9.94, which is considered high. Therefore, 
excluding GRP from the final regression should provide more robust results. Moreover, the 
data was checked for omitted variable bias by performing the Ramsey Reset test, showing that 
the data does not suffer from omitted variables. See appendix for Breusch-Pagan test, 
correlations matrix, VIF test and Ramsey Reset test.  
 
As can be seen, the coefficient for IPR protection is positive and significant on a 5 percent 
significance level. This indicates that better protection of intellectual property leads to more 
production of CDs, according to hypothesis 1. Technological development within provinces is 
positively correlated with CD production as well on a 5 percent significance level, which can 
be interpreted as the higher the level of technological development the more production of 
CDs. The share of lawyers and independent accountants in the population did not show a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable, which proves that the share of lawyers 
and independent accountants in the population does simply not affect CD production. There is 
reason to believe that lawyers and accountants have little to do with the IPR protection of 
music files specifically, – most cases of piracy might not require a lawyer and simply the 
existence of lawyers in the region of production might not affect the decisions of music 
producers. 
 
There is reason to believe that IPR protection has different effects on music production in 
different regions, especially considering a large country such as China. Thereby, two robust11 
fixed effects analyses were performed on coastal and non-coastal provinces respectively.  
  
                                                
10 The acceptable levels of the VIF test differ among the literature. For this specific study, a level of 4 has been 
chosen as acceptance level. 
11 Tests for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity showed that the separated data also suffers from 
heteroskedastic standard errors as well as a high VIF value for the variable GRP. Therefore, GRP was once again 
excluded from the regressions.  
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Table 3.3 IPR on CD Production for coastal and non-coastal provinces 
 CD Production CD Production 
Variables Coastal 
Provinces 
Non-Coastal 
Provinces 
   
IPR protection (lagged) .00239* -.000983 
 (.00118) (.00156) 
Share of lawyers & accountants (lagged) .00191 -.000142 
 (.00601) (.00144) 
Technological development .0144 .00540 
 (.0133) (.00352) 
Higher education 3.356 -1.739 
 (2.150) (1.259) 
Foreign investment -.00263 .00191 
 (.00266) (.00251) 
Share of agriculture -.00492 -.0361 
 (.213) (.0524) 
Constant -.0616 -.0165 
 (.107) (.0258) 
   
Observations 119 187 
R-squared 0.161 0.098 
Number of provinces 12 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When separating coastal and non-coastal provinces, IPR protection has a significant positive 
effect on CD production only within coastal provinces12. For the non-coastal provinces, it is 
not possible to prove that IPR protection has an affect on music production. In other words, it 
is not possible to prove that formal laws surrounding the music industry have any effect in 
non-coastal regions. Considering that social norms are important for formal laws to be 
properly implemented, there might be a bigger need for the social norms to change in non-
coastal areas. Without the norms surrounding perceptions of illegality changing, the legal 
framework might continue to have little effect. The potential disparity between coastal and 
non-coastal areas on a microeconomic level was considered beyond the scope of this study. 
However, with this finding on the macroeconomic level, research on differences in social 
norms between coastal and non-coastal areas is strongly encouraged for future analyses.   
                                                
12 The p-value for IPR protection is 0.068 for coastal provinces. 
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4. Microeconomic Study 
Many sociologists believe that the social and moral sanctions against illegal behavior are as 
important, and sometimes even more important, than legal sanctions (Grasmick & Green 
1980). Thereby, in order to get a broader view of the music industry, there is need for analysis 
of consumer behavior. Gathering micro-level data by means of a questionnaire, I aim to 
examine the social norms surrounding music consumption and perceptions of illegality.  
 
Two surveys, one Chinese and one Swedish, were constructed and distributed in order to 
investigate social norms regarding music consumption in China and Sweden. The main 
purpose for conducting the surveys among both Swedish and Chinese citizens is to compare 
the social norms within the countries. In 2009, Sweden introduced an anti-piracy law, 
IPRED13, as an attempt to stop illegal file sharing. The anti-piracy law, along with a guilty 
verdict in the high-profile The Pirate Bay-trial14, is assumed by the IFPI to have persuaded 
many consumers to try legal alternatives for consuming music. Remedies like these seem to 
have worked well for Sweden, which has had an overall market growth of 34 percent between 
the years of 2008 and 2013 (IFPI 2014:36). Considering the recent changes on the Swedish 
music market, it further motivates the comparison between Chinese and Swedish music 
consumers. This comparison might give an indication about the obstacles that the Chinese 
music industry faces when it comes to the population’s potential usage of legal music 
services, will to pay for music and attitude towards illegal downloading. 
4.1 Survey Design and Distribution 
Not complying with formal laws can lead to social consequences and the fear of social 
disapproval can be an important sanction against illegal behavior (Grasmick & Green 1980). 
Considering that the questionnaire aims to explain illegal activity, the design is of great 
importance. In order to minimize the risk of respondents feeling reluctant to provide honest 
answers, the survey questions regarding social behavior and illegal activity were constructed 
                                                
13 IPRED, or Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive, was a law implemented in 2009, aiming to 
make it easier to take action against illegal file sharing (NE 1). 
14 The Pirate Bay is a website that allows users to consume audio and video products at zero cost. The co-
founders of The Pirate Bay were found guilty in a trial in 2009 and were sentenced to one year in jail along with 
a 3.6 million US dollars fine (The Guardian 1). 
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in third-person (see survey questions 13 and 14). This technique was inspired by previous 
research performed by Nee & Opper (2012).  
 
Five survey questions are mainly analyzed in this study: 
 
Q12. How much are you willing to pay per month for unlimited access to music without 
any commercials or other disturbances? 
Q13. Assume that you are with two good friends and you see that one of your friends is 
downloading a music file from an illegal website. How do you think your other friend would react? 
Q14. Assume the same scenario as in the previous question. Would your friend who 
downloaded music from the illegal website be treated any differently after that?  
Q17. If your answer on the previous question15 was “Yes”, how many percent? 
Q18. If a friend of yours got caught for illegally downloading a music album, what 
would be you first reaction? 
 
These five questions aim to examine the will to pay for music, the reaction to illegal behavior, 
the treatment of a friend who downloads illegally, the share of friends who engage in music 
piracy and the reaction to someone getting caught for illegal downloading. Other control-
questions, such as age, gender, employment status, education level and financial situation 
were also included in the survey. A copy of the survey can be found in appendix. 
 
Before distributing the surveys, both surveys were tested among a group of 10-20 Chinese 
and Swedish people in the ages of 20-26 in order to check and be able to correct for instant 
mistakes. The target respondents were mainly young individuals, considering they are the first 
generation to have grown up with the Internet and there is reason to believe that young people 
are more adaptive and influenced by technological changes. The distribution of the two 
surveys took place mainly online via social media but also at Lund University in Lund, 
Sweden, and Fudan University in Shanghai, China. The surveys were conducted between 
January and April 2015 and the distribution of the responds can be found in section 4.3. The 
Swedish survey received 215 responds and consisted of 19 questions. The Chinese survey 
received 210 responds and consisted of 20 questions16. 
                                                
15 The previous question, Q16, is ”Within your circle of friends, do you think that anyone has ever illegally 
downloaded a music file?” 
16 For the Chinese survey an additional question was asked: ”Under which hukou were you born?” 
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4.2 Variables and Model Specification 
To test for hypothesis 2 and 3, five different regression models are conducted for each 
hypothesis where one includes only Chinese answers and the other one combines Chinese and 
Swedish responds to check for cross-cultural differences. For hypothesis 2, the main variables 
of interest for the regressions are the variables regarding social norms. For hypothesis 3 the 
main variable of interest is a dummy variable for country differences.  
 
The dependent variables are:  -­‐ Will to pay something -­‐ Treated differently after downloading -­‐ Percentage of friends who download illegally -­‐ Unfair if caught for illegal downloading of music -­‐ Okay to download illegally 
 
Will to pay something is a dummy variable where zero is coded as 0 and anything above zero 
is coded as 1. The independent variables for testing hypothesis 2 are: Treated differently 
(dummy), Percentage of friends who download illegally, Okay to download illegally 
(dummy), Unfair if caught (dummy) and Will to pay something (dummy). The independent 
variable to test for hypothesis 3, cross-cultural differences between Chinese and Swedish 
respondents, is: Chinese (dummy). The control variables are: Financial situation, Current user 
of a streaming service (dummy), Age, male (dummy), Urban hukou17 (dummy), Hours using 
music streaming services (dummy), Hours spent on the Internet (dummy), Employment status 
(dummy) and Education level (dummy). 
 
To test for social norms and cross-cultural differences, a general model is: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1Sit+ β2Xit + εit 
 
Where Yit is the dependent variable, S is a vector of different independent variables and X is a 
vector of control variables.
                                                
17 Urban hukou is only included when testing for hypothesis 2. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Below is a table showing descriptive statistics for the quantitative variables of the two 
different surveys. The financial situation is measured on a scale from 1-5 where 1 indicates 
that your financial situation is significantly lower than average, 3 is average and 5 is 
significantly higher than average. Education is a categorical variable where the lowest level of 
education is 1 (no schooling completed) and the highest level is 11 (postdoctoral). A higher 
number indicates a higher level of education. The same goes for hours using music streaming 
services, which is categorized into 5 different categories where 1 is the least time and 5 the 
most time. See appendix for a full description of the survey questions and answer categories18. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Chinese and Swedish Surveys  
Variables Obs. (CH) 
Obs. 
(SWE) 
Mean 
(CH) 
Mean 
(SWE) 
Std. Dev. 
(CH) 
Std. Dev. 
(SWE) 
Q2. Age 205 215 22.27 25.19 .48 06.49 
Q5. Education 210 215 7.1 5.88 1.96 2.05 
Q6. Financial situation 209 215 2.76 2.69 .89 .9 
Q7. Hours spent on the Internet 210 215 3.15 3.21 1.13 1.12 
Q11. Hours using streaming 
service 191 189 2.7 3.55 1.03 1.32 
Q12. Will to pay for music per 
month 210 215 11.27 112.11 19.63 94.93 
Q17. % of friends that 
download illegally 207 208 59.36 78.56 39.88 22.92 
Q20. # of friends that have been 
caught 3 4 2 2.25 1 1.89 
 
The table shows the distribution of responds for the Chinese and Swedish surveys 
respectively. As can be seen, one of the biggest differences can be found in the will to pay for 
music. The average response for the Chinese is 19.63 RMB, while the average response for 
the Swedish are 94.93 SEK19. Only considering the exchange rate, this can be seen as a big 
difference in the will to pay. A graph with the willingness to pay for the two nationalities 
                                                
18 The survey questions not discussed or presented in this paper were not considered important for the research. 
19 19.63 RMB translated to 26.51 SEK on May 5th, 2014. 
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using PPP adjusted US dollars20 will be presented later, showing that the difference still 
remains after adjusting to PPP.  Looking at the percentage of friends who download illegally 
we can see that the average is higher for Swedish respondents. However, as mentioned in 
limitations, there was some confusion among the Chinese respondents regarding what was 
illegal and not. Therefore, the numbers for Chinese respondents might be higher in reality. 
Figure 4.1 Gender Distribution of the Chinese and Swedish Survey 
 
The figure above shows the distribution of gender for the respondents of the Chinese and 
Swedish surveys respectively. The Swedish responds are presented in the bars to the right. 
 
The Chinese hukou system is a system that divides residents into urban or rural. Even today, 
the hukou system creates a rural-urban divide and possessing an urban residence permit 
provides access to many benefits that rural hukou holders cannot enjoy while staying in urban 
areas (Naughton 2007: 116). In figure 4.2 we can see the distribution of hukous among the 
Chinese respondents.  
Figure 4.2 Chinese Hukou  
 
                                                
20 Purchasing power parity, PPP, gives the exchange value of a currency by eliminating price differences 
between countries. PPP is often used to minimize the risk of conducting misleading international comparisons. 
For this study, PPP data for the year 2014 is used. 
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Figure 4.3 Employment Status 
 
A majority of the respondents are students, which is expected as the target group was young 
adults and a large share of students can be assumed to be of younger ages. Again, the Swedish 
responds can be seen in the bars to the right. 
 
Survey question 1321 was: “Assume that you are with two good friends and you see that one 
of them is downloading a music file from an illegal website. How do you think you other 
friend would react?” The possible responds and their distribution can be seen in the graph 
below.  
Figure 4.4 Reactions to illegal downloading 
 
                                                
21 Question 13 is number 12, question 14 is number 13 and question 18 is number 17 on the Swedish survey, due 
to one less question in total. 
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It is worth noting that both surveys show that more than 80 percent of the respondents believe 
that illegal downloading is acceptable social behavior. 25 percent of the Chinese respondents 
even answered that they would be interested and want to learn more about it.  
 
Question 14 was: “Assume the same scenario as in the previous question. Would your friend 
who downloaded illegally be treated any differently after that?” The possible responds and 
their distribution can be shown in the table below.  
Figure 4.5 Treated differently after illegal downloading 
 
As can be seen from the table, the Chinese survey shows a higher percentage of respondents 
answering that their friend would be treated differently afterwards. 64.9 percent of the 
Chinese answered no on the question, while 97.67 percent of the Swedish respondents 
answered no. This indicates that illegal downloading causes more reactions, either positive or 
negative, in China than in Sweden.  
 
Finally, question number 18 was ”If a friend of yours got caught for illegally downloading a 
music album, what would be your first reaction?” Again, the possible responds and their 
distribution can be shown in the table below.  
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Figure 4.6 Reactions to a friend getting caught for illegal downloading 
 
The graph above indicates that the Chinese respondents believe, to a greater extent than the 
Swedish, that if a friend got caught for illegal downloading it would be unfair (58.74 and 
44.19 percent respectively). Thinking that it is unfair if caught for illegal downloading is 
connected to formal laws and since formal laws surrounding intellectual property have a 
shorter history in China than in Sweden22, this result might not be too surprising. However, 
the overall responds are relatively similar and few respondents answered that it would be 
completely fair. Regressions on the behavioral differences between Chinese and Swedish 
consumers will be presented in the result section below. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the Swedish and Chinese consumers’ will to pay for an unlimited supply of 
music without disturbances (such as advertisements). The values are in US dollars, where the 
will to pay in CNY and SEK is adjusted for by using the purchasing power parities.  
Figure 4.7 Will to Pay for Unlimited Access to Music 
 
                                                
22 The first patent law of the People’s Republic of China was implemented in 1984, but has been amended in 
1992 and most recently in 2001 (Embassy of the United States). In Sweden, a patent law has been in place since 
1960’s (The Swedish Parliament). 
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From the figure above it is clear that Swedish music consumers are significantly more willing 
to pay for unlimited access to music compared to Chinese music consumers. Even when 
converting the responds to PPP adjusted US dollars, we can see that a majority of the Chinese 
respondents are willing to pay less than 20, while a majority of the Swedish are willing to pay 
more than 20. However, as can be seen from the figure below, the lower will to pay for music 
among Chinese consumers does not seem to affect their usage of music streaming services. 
Figure 4.8 Usage of Music Streaming Services 
  
The high usage of music streaming services among Chinese respondents (89 percent) and the 
low will to pay implies that Chinese music streaming services are less costly and often for 
free. 
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4.4 Results
Regression outputs from four Probit regressions and one Tobit regression are presented in the 
table below.
Table 4.2 Chinese Responds 
Variables 1. Will to 
pay 
Something 
(probit) 
2. % of 
friends that 
download 
illegally 
(tobit) 
3. Unfair if 
caught for 
downloading 
(probit) 
4. Okay to 
download 
illegally 
(probit) 
5. Treated  
Differently 
(probit) 
Will to pay something  4.574 .285 .299 -.392* 
  (6.972) (.287) (.196) (.208) 
% of friends that download 
illegally 
.00361 
(.00254) 
 .00731** 
(.00342) 
-9.71e-05 
(.00252) 
.00726*** 
(.00268) 
      
Unfair if caught for 
downloading 
.287 
(.190) 
.716 
(6.754) 
 -.107 
(.271) 
.324 
(.203) 
      
Okay to download illegally .123 20.79** .00754  1.119*** 
 (.288) (10.38) (.285)  (.291) 
Treated differently -.421* 24.03*** 1.087*** .285  
 (.218) (7.790) (.295) (.215)  
Urban hukou .786*** -19.45** .232 -.158 .217 
 (.227) (8.029) (.290) (.226) (.237) 
Financial situation -.0176 -6.248 .153 .0633 -.0483 
 (.109) (3.992) (.153) (.109) (.122) 
Age  .00521 1.814 .00619 -.0147 .0166 
 (.0297) (1.203) (.0442) (.0300) (.0312) 
Male  .253 10.06 .379 .208 .256 
 (.209) (8.078) (.317) (.219) (.219) 
Employment status -.0196 4.288 .202 .0167 -.0922 
 (.102) (3.864) (.141) (.106) (.111) 
Education -.00707 1.522 -.00642 .0550 -.0661 
 (.0528) (1.841) (.0692) (.0525) (.0541) 
Hours streaming music -.0359 -3.850 .418*** -.0137 -.0646 
 (.0725) (2.398) (.0951) (.0779) (.0704) 
User of streaming service23 .314 30.57**  .308 .0287 
 (.407) (13.97)  (.422) (.405) 
Hours on the internet .137* -2.516 -.0774 -.0167 .213*** 
 (.0733) (2.556) (.1077) (.0743) (.0806) 
Constant -1.546 2.874 -3.900** -.343 -1.572 
 (1.061) (40.59) (1.552) (1.136) (1.179) 
      
Observations 199 199 178 199 199 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                
23 The variable user of streaming service in model 3 was omitted due to the dependent variable not varying 
within the variable. 
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Performing a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity showed that the data suffers from 
heteroskedastic standard errors. This was corrected for by performing robust regressions. A 
correlation matrix can be found in appendix, and no high correlations were found between the 
variables. 
 
The will to pay is negatively correlated with treated differently, which indicates that treating 
someone differently after illegal downloading is related to a lower will to pay for music. 
However, the variable treated differently is considered unreliable due to possible 
misinterpretation of the question. In some cases, the treatment of someone could be positive, 
specifically contemplating that Chinese respondents displayed interest in learning how to 
download illegally (see figure 4.4). The percentage of friends who download illegally is 
significantly correlated with the variable okay to download illegally. This implies that the 
more accepting of music piracy you are, the more friends you have who engage in illegal 
activities. The other way around, - that the larger share of friends who engage in illegal 
activities the more accepting you are, is also likely to be true. This correlation shows the 
importance of social norms when it comes to illegal behavior and proves that if the norm is 
that it is acceptable to download illegally, more people within your peer-group will do so.  A 
significant correlation is further found between the percentage of friends who download 
illegally and the belief that it is unfair if a friend gets caught (model 3). In other words, having 
more people around you who are involved in music piracy is correlated with the idea that it is 
unfair if someone receives legal punishment for engaging in such behavior. This seems quite 
intuitive and, once again, it shows how the surroundings and social norms can affect one’s 
behavior.  
 
Considering the control variables, it seems as if more time spent on the Internet leads to a 
higher probability to be willing to pay something and of treating someone differently after 
illegally downloading a music file. In other words, people who spend more time on the 
Internet seem to be willing to pay more for music and are more likely to change their opinion 
of someone who consumes music illegally (positively or negatively). However, it is important 
to note that the causality is not established; hence it may be that people who are willing to pay 
more for music are also more frequently using the Internet. Furthermore, the control variable 
urban hukou shows a positive significance on the will to pay something and a negative 
correlation with the percentage of friends who download illegally. This indicates that urban 
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hukou holders are more willing to pay for music and have fewer friends who download 
illegally.  
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Investigating the potential differences between Swedish and Chinese music consumers, five 
different regressions were again performed on the equivalent dependent variables as in table 
4.2. The independent variables are the same except for the exclusion of the variable urban 
hukou and inclusion of the variable Chinese, which is a dummy variable coded 1 for Chinese 
respondents and 0 for Swedish. 
Table 4.3 Behavioral Differences Between Chinese and Swedish Respondents 
 
Variables 
 
 
 
1. Will to pay 
Something 
(probit) 
2. % of 
friends that 
download 
illegally 
(tobit) 
3. Unfair if 
caught for 
downloading 
(probit) 
4. Okay to 
download 
illegally 
(probit) 
 
5. Treated  
Differently 
(probit) 
Will to pay something  2.402 .130 .0970 -.340* 
  (4.953) (.215) (.158) (.203) 
Treated differently -.252 23.24*** 1.083*** .143  
 (.199) (6.247) (.248) (.198)  
% of friends that 
download illegally 
.00158 
(.00217) 
 .00668** 
(.00272) 
.00260 
(.00207) 
.00693*** 
(.00250) 
      
Unfair if caught for 
downloading 
.0635 
(.147) 
5.269 
(3.667) 
 .188 
(.164) 
.272 
(.194) 
      
Okay to download 
illegally 
.110 
(.206) 
12.71** 
(5.525) 
.209 
(.186) 
 1.163*** 
(.248) 
      
Chinese -1.216*** -5.269 .326 .443** 1.089** 
 (.194) (4.920) (.254) (.177) (.333) 
Financial situation .0378 -5.158** .0799 .0372 -.0421 
 (.0828) (2.008) (.0987) (.0733) (.112) 
User of streaming service .541 18.12* -2.006*** .271 .108 
 (.341) (9.498) (.522) (.307) (.400) 
Age  -.00359 1.0031 -.0433*** -.00143 .0178 
 (.0138) (.6531) (.0162) (.0138) (.0218) 
Male  -.0536 9.633** .511*** -.0597 .286 
 (.155) (3.997) (.195) (.137) (.197) 
Hours on the Internet .0600 -.420 -.111 .0747 .168** 
 (.0548) (1.537) (.0730) (.0516) (.0724) 
Employment status -.00806 -.312 .113 .0570 -.0608 
 (.0753) (1.746) (.100) (.0612) (.0830) 
Education  .0165 .488 -.0423 -.0456 -.0989** 
 (.0376) (.980) (.0434) (.0328) (.0450) 
Hours streaming music -.0931* -1.717 .163*** -.0265 -.0849 
 (.0520) (1.218) (.0599) (.0456) (.0650) 
Constant .857 42.85** 1.756* -1.140 .832 
 (.732) (16.62) (.934) (.705) (.940) 
      
Observations 407 412 407 407 407 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Again, a Breusch-Pagan test showed that the data suffers from heteroskedasticity, which has 
been corrected for by performing robust regressions. As for the previous data, no high 
correlations were found between the variables when checking for multicollinearity (see 
appendix). 
 
From the regression outputs above, we can see that the variable Chinese is significant on a 5-
percent level for three out of five dependent variables. In other words, there are proven 
differences in behavior on those three questions. Will to pay something is significantly 
negatively correlated with the variable Chinese, which we could see an indication for in figure 
4.7 in section 4.3. This proves that the Chinese are significantly less willing to pay for music 
compared to Swedish. The responds “yes” and “maybe” on the question of whether someone 
who illegally downloaded a music file would be treated any differently afterwards were both 
coded as 1, and the answer “no” as 0. From the results we can see that the Chinese 
respondents show a higher probability of treating someone who illegally downloads a music 
file differently compared to Swedish respondents. However, this could be due to the 
uncertainty that the Chinese respondents showed regarding what is legal behavior and not as 
well as the nature of the question, and should thereby be interpreted with caution.  
 
Chinese respondents further seem to believe, to a greater extent than the Swedish, that it is 
acceptable to download illegally (survey question 13). From figure 4.4 we could see a high 
percentage of Chinese respondents who answered that, if a friend downloaded illegally, they 
would be interested and want to learn more about it. This answer was bundled in as a respond 
that indicated that illegal downloading was acceptable and thereby has an impact on the 
positive coefficient. However, wanting to learn more about it also indicates less knowledge in 
the matter and, as previously mentioned, some confusion regarding what is illegal and not 
occurred when conducting the Chinese survey. This further emphasizes a need to develop the 
formal institutions surrounding music piracy in order to make the distinction between legal 
and illegal more transparent. The percentage of friends who download illegally is 
insignificant for the variable Chinese, which means that any difference in illegal downloading 
between Chinese and Swedish respondents cannot be proven. Furthermore, it is not possible 
to prove any significant differences between Chinese and Swedish respondents when it comes 
to whether or not it would be unfair if someone got caught for illegal downloading.  
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When including the responds from both surveys, some interesting results could be found 
among the control variables. On a 5-percent significance level we can again see that more 
hours spent on the Internet is negatively correlated with the probability of treating someone 
who downloads illegally any differently. Higher education shows a negative correlation with 
treating someone differently. Again, this result is difficult to interpret due to potential 
misinterpretation of the question. The variable male shows a positive relationship with % of 
friends that download illegally and unfair if caught for downloading. This implies that male 
respondents have more friends who download illegally and have a more negative outlook on 
legal punishment for music piracy in comparison to females. Financial situation, user of 
streaming service and age also showed significant results for some models. Respondents with 
better financial situations have a smaller share of friends who download illegally, which 
implies that a better financial situation provides less incentive for engaging in illegal 
behavior. Users of music streaming services have a larger share of friends who engage in 
music piracy and are also more likely to believe that it is unfair if someone gets caught. 
Finally, older people are more likely to believe that it is fair if someone gets caught for illegal 
downloading of music.  
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5. Discussion 
Stronger protection of IPR has a significant positive effect on CD production. This is 
according to utilitarian theory and according to hypothesis 1. However, when dividing the 
data into coastal and non-coastal provinces, the results are only significant for coastal 
provinces. This indicates that IPR protection is more efficient in coastal areas. This should 
provide incentive to further develop formal institutions surrounding IPR in China, especially 
in coastal areas where it seems to have a more significant effect. However, developing IPR in 
non-coastal areas should not be discarded. Development could eventually lead to more 
efficiency and with a change in formal institutions the informal institutions, such as social 
norms, could change as well, which could have a big effect on the music industry in the long 
run. It is important to note that there might be a third factor involved causing the relationship 
between CD production and IPR protection. Imagine that one could measure the level of 
creativity of the population, – this could affect the production of music and also encourage a 
higher level of IPR protection (since it would create a bigger need for protection of 
intellectual property). In other words, the found relationship can be caused by a factor that is 
not included in the regression but affects both variables to move together and the result might 
not necessarily mean that the two variables are directly correlated. Nevertheless, the found 
relationship provides an indication that the two are related to each other and how they move 
together.  
 
Considering hypothesis 2, that social norms affect consumption of music and the perception 
of illegal behavior in China, some interesting results were found. Being more accepting of 
music piracy is positively correlated with the percentage of friends who download illegally, 
which proves that social norms matter when it comes to consuming music illegally. 
Furthermore, thinking that it is unfair if a friend gets caught for downloading is also 
positively correlated with the percentage of friends who download illegally. These results 
confirm hypothesis 2, that social norms affect consumption and perception of illegal behavior 
in China.  
 
There are significant behavioral differences between Chinese and Swedish music consumers, 
which confirms hypothesis 3. The will to pay something for music, whether a friend who 
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downloads illegally would be treated differently afterwards and believing that it is okay to 
download illegally are three variables where significant differences could be found between 
the two groups. The results suggest that the Chinese have a lower will to pay for music and 
that they are more likely to treat someone who downloads illegally differently in the future. 
As previously mentioned, the low will to pay in relation to the high usage of music streaming 
services indicates that the Chinese are used to listening to music to a low (or non-existing) 
price. The fact that Swedish respondents are less likely to treat someone who has downloaded 
illegally any differently could perhaps be explained by the fact that Sweden has had a history 
of piracy and a longer history of technological development with Internet access. Sweden has 
only recently developed into a music streaming service “utopia”, with a high number of 
paying subscribers to the music service Spotify. Considering this, the Swedish respondents 
might be more used to illegal downloading and are thereby less likely to treat someone who 
downloads illegally any differently. Furthermore, it is once again worth mentioning that the 
survey question did not specify how a person would be treated differently and it is thereby 
difficult do draw exact conclusions.  
 
Considering the high-piracy environment in China mentioned in the introduction, it might 
seem surprising that we could not see any significant differences between Chinese and 
Swedish respondents on the percentage of friends who download illegally. However, this 
result might depend somewhat on the nature of the question. Had the question instead been 
“how many percent of your friends do you think download music on a regular basis today?” 
the result might have been different considering the Swedish music industry has recently 
evolved into a more paying model. Furthermore, Chinese respondents demonstrated confusion 
regarding what is legal and illegal when answering the survey, which might also explain this 
outcome. This confusion shows that there is a need for a clearer distinction between legal and 
illegal music on the Chinese music market. If a consumer does not know that a certain action 
is against the law, the laws might provide very little deterrence value.  
 
From table 4.4, showing the distribution of responses for the survey question of how a friend 
would react if another friend downloaded an illegal music file, it is shown that 25 percent of 
the Chinese respondents answered that they would be interested and want to learn more about 
it, in comparison to less than 4 percent of the Swedish respondents. This implies less 
knowledge of illegal file sharing, and most importantly what characterizes illegal file sharing, 
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compared to Swedish music consumers. Hence, the line between consuming music legally 
and illegally is not always clear in China. As before mentioned, much confusion occurred 
while conducting the survey in China but not in Sweden, which further stresses the 
importance of a stronger regulatory system that distinguishes between what is legal and what 
is illegal.  
 
In order for China (with its large potential consumer market) to become a big music industry, 
further action against copyright infringement should be taken. If a large part of the population 
has trouble affording expensive goods, this might be an indicator for the high piracy level, 
and China suffers from large income disparities. Beginning in the 1950’s, the household 
registration system (hukou) divided rural and urban residents by a strict system. This system 
is to a large part responsible for today’s urban-rural divide and income inequality (Park 2008). 
The urban-rural divide is further shown in this research, seeing as rural hukou holders have a 
lower will to pay and a higher percentage of friends who download illegally in comparison to 
urban hukou holders. According to the World Bank, China remains a developing country 
where poverty reduction is a fundamental challenge. However, the World Bank estimated that 
with a GDP growth of 10 percent on average each year since 1978, approximately 500 million 
people have been lifted out of poverty (World Bank 1). As poverty reduces and the average 
income rises, there might be more incentive to purchase legitimate products over pirated ones 
(China Music Business 1). In Sweden, fast broadband was introduced early, which first led to 
illegal file sharing through the popular website The Pirate Bay. However, since Spotify 
launched in 2008, streaming became widely popular, as previously mentioned. It is estimated 
that around three million Swedes already have streaming accounts. Monthly subscriptions to 
music services such as Spotify might be doing particularly well in Sweden since Sweden can 
be considered as a rather rich country (The Economist 1).  
 
The low will to pay among Chinese music consumers proves the tough challenges that face 
music producers in China today. As previously mentioned, the will to pay might be 
influenced heavily by the actual need to pay. Thereby, it is important to note that the current 
will to pay is not necessarily unchangeable. Furthermore, the high number of users of music 
streaming services could provide incentives to further develop these services. The positive 
relationship between IPR protection and music production in China implies that further 
development of regulation of IPR is beneficial for a growing music industry. With changing 
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formal institutions and informal norms, which this research has proven to have an effect on 
music production, there might be hopes for a viable music industry in China in the future.  
5.1 Conclusions 
The results from this research challenges and refutes the notion that effective protection of 
intellectual property rights is unnecessary within the music industry in China. The significant 
positive relationship between IPR protection and CD production should provide incentive to 
further develop the formal institutions surrounding property rights. However, when dividing 
the data into coastal and non-coastal provinces, the significant effect can only be proven for 
coastal provinces. IPR protection has no significant effect for non-coastal regions, which 
could be an indication for differences in social norms that effect how the formal regulations 
are implemented. 
 
In order for a change to happen the informal institutions, such as social norms, need to change 
as well. This study shows that a stronger belief that it is acceptable to engage in music piracy 
is positively correlated with the share of friends who download illegally. Furthermore, the 
percentage of friends who download illegally is also positively correlated with thinking that it 
is unfair if a friend gets caught for illegal behavior. These results indicate that social norms 
play a role when it comes to legal and illegal music consumption. Looking at cross-cultural 
differences between Chinese and Swedish music consumers, the will to pay something for 
music, whether a friend who downloads illegally would be treated differently afterwards and 
believing that illegal downloading is acceptable are three variables where significant 
differences could be found between the two groups. Chinese consumers show a significantly 
lower will to pay for music and also a higher probability to treat someone who downloads 
illegally differently afterwards (positive or negative). Chinese consumers also seem to have a 
more positive outlook on illegal downloading of music.  
 
In conclusion, this study has proven the importance of IPR protection and social norms when 
it comes to the Chinese music industry. Neither formal nor informal institutions should be 
neglected in order for the industry to flourish. This knowledge should provide greater 
incentives for future regulation of music piracy, especially with a clearer distinction between 
legal and illegal consumption, and greater understanding of how Chinese as well as Swedish 
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consumers behave. It is my belief that the Chinese music industry has great potential and that 
this research could be used as guidance for the future growth of the industry. 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
In order to further investigate how formal and informal institutions surrounding the music 
industry works, I suggest gathering more data both on an individual and macroeconomic 
level. If found, data for all music production and not only CD production on provincial level 
would provide a more precise picture of today’s music industry and perhaps another measure 
for IPR protection, other than patent applications and patents granted, could provide sturdier 
results.  
 
For future studies I also wish to inspire including interaction variables on the differences 
between Swedish and Chinese consumers to see whether there is a difference between the two 
nationalities when it comes to the effect that norms has on consumption and perception of 
illegality. This was considered beyond the scope of this research but would provide a deeper 
analysis of cross-cultural differences. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that comparing 
China with other countries than Sweden could provide useful knowledge of how social norms 
within the music industry differ among cultures.  
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Appendix 
Chinese/English Survey 
 
????????????????  
Music Consumption in China – Survey  
 
????????? Please answer the questions as honestly as possible.  
????????? Your answers are completely anonymous.  
?????10?? Expected time: Less than 10 minutes  
 
1. ???Gender?   2. ???Age? _____  
q ? Female  
q ?Male  
 
3. ????????Under which hukou were you born?  
q ???? Rural  q ???? Urban  
 
4. 您????业???? What is your current employment status?  
q ?? Employed for wages, full-time  
q ?? Employed for wages, part-time  
q ???? Self-employed  
q ???????Out of work and looking for work  
q ????????Out of work but not currently looking for work  
q ?? Student  
q ?? Retired  
q ?????????????Unable to work  
q ?? Other: ______________________________ 
 
5. ???????What is the highest educational level you have reached?  
??????????????  
q ????????? No schooling completed  
q ???? Lower schooling than high school  
q ???? Some high school (did not graduate)  
q ???? High school graduate  
q ???? Academy/Institution, no degree  
q ???? Academy/Institution, degree  
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q ???? Some university credits, no degree  
q ???? Bachelor’s degree  
q ?????Master’s degree  
q ???? Ph.D.  
q ??? Postdoctoral  
 
6. ??????????????Comparing your financial situation to the average 
Chinese, how much money do you make/have?  
????????? Please mark with an X  
 
   Significantly   Average                     Significantly 
less than average  Chinese                  more than 
average 
             ?                              ??                                     ?                         
             1                          2                           3                4                               5 
             …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. ?????????????How many hours per day do you spend on the 
Internet?  
-?????????????? Not included time spent for work  
-????????????? Including applications (apps)  
q ????? Less than 1 hour  
q ????? 1-2 hours  
q ????? 3-4 hours  
q ????? 5-6 hours  
q ????? 7-8 hours  
q ?????More than 8 hours  
 
8. ???????????????????Do you have a private computer with 
Internet connection? 
q ? Yes  q ? No  
 
9. ????????????????  Are you a current user of any music 
streaming service?  
??????????????????????????????????? 
q ? Yes  q ? No  
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10. ?????????“?”?????????????????If your 
answer was “No” on the previous question, would you consider becoming a user in the 
future?  
q ? Yes  q ? No  q ???Maybe  
 
11. ??????????“?”??????????????????If your 
answer was “Yes” on question 9, how often do you use the service/services?  
q ??????? Less than 1 hour per week  
q ??????? 1-4 hours per week  
q ??????? 5-10 hours per week  
q ????????? 11-20 hours per week  
q ?????????? 21-40 hours per week  
q ????????More than 40 hours per week  
 
12. ???????????????????????????How much 
would you be willing to pay per month for unlimited access to music files without 
commercials or other disturbances? ???????????????“0”  If you would 
not be willing to pay anything, just write “0” 
¥??? ___________ 
 
13. ?????????????????????????????????
??????????????Assume that you are with two good friends and you 
see that one of your friends is downloading a music file from an illegal website. How do 
you think your other friend would react?  
q ?????????????????? He/she would be interested and want to learn 
more about it  
q ??????? He/she would not care / nothing would happen  
q ???????????????????? He/she would mention that it is illegal 
but would not try to stop it  
q ?????? He/she would tell him/her to stop  
q ???????????????????? He/she would gossip and tell other 
people about it  
q ????????????????? He/she would contact the authorities and report 
him/her for illegal behavior  
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14. ?????????????????????????????????
????Assume the same scenario as in the previous question. Would your friend who 
downloaded music from the illegal website be treated any differently after that?  
q ? Yes  q ? No  q ???Maybe  
 
15. ????????????????? CD ??Within your circle of friends, do 
you think that anyone would buy a pirated CD? ????????? 
For example on a street market 
q ? Yes  q ? No  
 
16. ?????????????????????Within your circle of friends, 
do you think that anyone has ever illegally downloaded a music file?  
q ? Yes  
q ? No 
 
 
 
 
17. ?????????“?”??????????????If your answer on the 
previous question was “Yes”, how many?  
?????  Please write in percent _____ % 
 
18. ????????????????????????If a friend of yours got 
caught for illegally downloading a music album, what would be you first reaction?  
???: 
q ???? Completely unfair  
q ???? Slightly unfair  
q ????? Neither fair nor unfair  
q ????? Slightly fair  
q ????? Completely fair  
 
19. ????????????????????????Within your circle of 
friends, has anyone ever been caught for illegal downloading?  
q ? Yes  
q ???????? No, not that I know  
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20. ?????????“?”?????????????  
If your answer on the previous question was “Yes”, how many?   
??????? Please write a number _____ 
 
 
Thank you 谢谢! 
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Tests on Macroeconomic Data 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity  
 
Source: Stata 
 
Correlations Matrix  
 
Source: Stata 
 
Variance Inflator test 
 
Source: Stata 
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Ramsey RESET test for Omitted Variables  
Source: Stata 
 
Tests on Microeconomic Data 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity – Chinese Responds 
 
Source: Stata 
 
Correlations Matrix – Chinese Responds 
Source: Stata 
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Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity – Chinese & Swedish Responds 
 
Source: Stata 
 
Correlations matrix – Chinese & Swedish Responds 
Source: Stata
 
